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Abstract. Roger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles (logical para-
doxes), dating from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries from
his solution. The third states that there is a contradictory pair of proposi-
tions both of which are false. This appears to contradict what Whitaker,
in his iconoclastic reading of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, dubbed “The
Rule of Contradictory Pairs” (RCP), which requires that in every such
pair, one must be true and the other false. Whitaker argued that, im-
mediately after defining the notion of a contradictory pair, in which
one statement affirms what the other denies of the same thing, Aris-
totle himself gave counterexamples to the rule. This gives some credence
to Swyneshed’s claim that his solution to the logical paradoxes is not
contrary to Aristotle’s teaching, as many of Swyneshed’s contemporaries
claimed. Insolubles are false, he said, because they falsify themselves; and
their contradictories are false because they falsely deny that the insoluble
itself is false. Swyneshed’s solution depends crucially on the revision he
makes to the acount of truth and falsehood, brought out in his first the-
sis: that a false proposition can signify as it is, or as Paul of Venice, who
took up and developed Swyneshed’s solution some sixty years later, puts
it, a false proposition can have a true significate. Swyneshed gave a fur-
ther counterexample to (RCP) when he claimed that some insolubles, like
future contingents, are neither true nor false. Dialetheism, the contem-
porary claim that some propositions are both true and false, is wedded
to the Rule, and in consequence divorces denial from the assertion of the
contradictory negation. Consequently, Swyneshed’s logical heresy is very
different from that found in dialetheism.
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1. The Rule of Contradictory Pairs
In his treatise on insolubles, written in the early 1330s, the Oxford Calculator
Roger Swyneshed made three notorious iconoclastic claims:
1. There is a false proposition which principally signifies as things are
2. There is a formally valid inference with true premise and false conclusion
3. There is a pair of contradictory propositions both of which are false.1
In this paper, I am concerned for the most part with the third thesis.2 It is
very natural to dismiss it out of hand, as I did myself in my ‘Introduction’
to my edition of Bradwardine’s treatise on insolubles [7, p. 24]. I wrote: “No
true logician would accept (3.) . . . [C]ontradictories cannot both be false, by
definition.”
But this judgment is too hasty. We owe the introduction of the notion
of contradictory pairs of propositions to Aristotle, or as he called them, an-
tiphases. I quote from De Interpretatione, ch. 6:3
“We mean by affirmation a statement affirming one thing of another;
we mean by negation a statement denying one thing of another. As
men can affirm and deny the presence of that which is present and
the presence of that which is absent and this they can do with ref-
erence to times that lie outside the present: whatever a man may
affirm, it is possible as well to deny, and whatever a man may deny,
it is possible as well to affirm. Thus, it follows, each affirmative
statement will have its own opposite negative, just as each nega-
tive statement will have its affirmative opposite. Every such pair of
propositions we, therefore, shall call contradictories, always assum-
ing the predicates and subjects are really the same and the terms
used without ambiguity. These and some other provisos are needed
in view of the puzzles propounded by importunate sophists.” [1, pp.
123–5, 17a27–34]
Contradictories are often nowadays defined as two propositions, or state-
ments, that cannot both be true and cannot both be false. But that is not
how Aristotle defines them. Rather, for him, in a pair of contradictories, one
affirms of something what the other denies of it. As we will see, these defi-
nitions are not necessarily equivalent. One might call Aristotle’s definition in
1Note that throughout this paper, I will use ‘proposition’ to refer to what the medievals
referred to as ‘propositiones’, that is, concrete token sentences, whether spoken, written or
mental.
2I will also discuss the first. The second clearly demands attention too: it would seem to
entail that Swyneshed’s account of consequence is not the impossibility of true premises
and false conclusion, in which case, what is his account? It is preservation of principally
signifying as it is: see Spade [29, §35, pp. 191–2] and Spade’s comment in Heytesbury [12,
p. 76 n.31]. See also Read [26].
3This work of Aristotle’s is variously known under the Greek title, Peri Hermeneias, the
Latin, De Interpretatione, and the English, On Interpretation. I resist the last in being
particularly unhelpful and misleading. De Rijk [10, p. 191] takes from Gabriel Nuchelmans
the neologism ‘apophantics’ to describe its content. A clearer term might be to call it ‘On
Utterances’ or ‘On the Expression of Thoughts’.
Swyneshed, Aristotle and the Rule of Contradictory Pairs
terms of affirmation and denial a syntactic definition, and the modern one
in terms of truth and falsehood, a semantic definition. Note that Aristotle’s
definition guarantees that every statement has a contradictory and says what
it is, whereas the semantic definition does not.4
In his study of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, C.W.A. Whitaker chal-
lenged the orthodox reading of this treatise and argued that immediately after
introducing the notion of contradictories in ch. 6, Aristotle set out, in effect, to
show the inequivalence of the two definitions. He did this by providing coun-
terexamples to what Whitaker dubs “the Rule of Contradictory Pairs” (RCP);
that in each contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false. In ch.
7, Whitaker says, Aristotle gives examples of contradictory pairs each member
of which is true; in ch. 8, pairs each of which is false; and in the famous ch. 9,
concerning the future sea-battle, pairs each of which is true or false, but not
determinately either.5
Russell Jones [15] echoes Whitaker’s analysis, agreeing that Aristotle’s
target is (RCP), but disagreeing on the detail. In particular, he rejects
Whitaker’s claim that in ch. 7, Aristotle shows that both members of a pair
can be true, and the claim that in ch. 9, Aristotle accepts that each member
of the pair is true or false. To be clear, let us spell out five theses which are in
play:
RCP (Rule of Contradictory Pairs) In a contradictory pair, one member is
true and the other false
BV (Bivalence) Every proposition is either true or false
EM (Excluded Middle) Everything either holds or does not hold of any one
thing at any one time
CV (Contravalence) No proposition is both true and false
NC (Non-Contradiction) Nothing both holds and does not hold of any one
thing at any one time
Given that every proposition is one of a pair of contradictories, (RCP) entails
(BV). Note that both (RCP) and (BV) have the cancellable (Gricean) impli-
cature ‘and not both’. (BV) and (EM) on the one hand, and (CV) and (NC)
on the other are equivalent by Aristotle’s account of truth and falsehood in
the Metaphysics:
“To say that that which is is not or that which is not is, is a false-
hood; and to say that that which is is and that which is not is not,
is true.” [2, p. 23, 1011b26–28]
4Horn [13, §1] claims that Aristotle “shift[ed] from a formal to a semantically based criterion
of opposition” when setting out contradictories in the square of opposition. Not so: just as
‘pale is not said of Socrates’ denies of Socrates what ‘pale is said of Socrates’ affirms of him,
so too ‘pale is not said of every man’, or equivalently ‘pale is not said of some man’ (in the
latter, ‘some’ “scopes out” over ‘not’), denies of man (the universal) what ‘pale is said of
every man’ affirms of man, and ‘pale is said of no man’ denies of man what ‘pale is said of
some man’ affirms of man.
5See also Kneale and Kneale [16, p. 47].
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Whereas (RCP) is about pairs of propositions, (BV) and (CV) are about in-
dividual propositions, and (EM) and (NC) are about things.
Jones’ objection to Whitaker’s analysis of ch. 7 turns on whether Aristotle
really does deny (CV). He certainly asserts (NC) in the Metaphysics:
“For the same thing to hold good and not to hold good simultane-
ously of the same thing and in the same respect is impossible,” [2,
p. 7, 1005b19–20]
which is equivalent to (CV) by the account of truth and falsehood just quoted.
The focus of De Interpretatione ch. 7 is on indeterminate propositions such
as ‘Man is pale’. Whitaker takes them to be non-universal statements about
universals. As such, ‘Man is pale’ is true because some men are pale. But ‘Man
is not pale’ is also true, because some men are not pale. So the contradictory
pair, ‘Man is pale’ and ‘Man is not pale’, one affirming of the universal man
what the other denies, are both true. So there are true contradictions, pairs of
contradictories both of which are true.
Whitaker [32, ch. 12] claims that this is not in fact a violation of the prin-
ciple of Non-Contradiction, (NC). All that ‘Man is pale’ says is that some man
is pale, so to affirm and deny paleness of man is not to claim that the same
thing both holds and does not hold of the same thing in the same respect at the
same time, only that “part of the universal might be pale and part not pale.”
[32, p. 157] Jones [15, p. 41] rightly dismisses this as a fudge. On that read-
ing, ‘Man is pale’ and ‘Man is not pale’ are no longer contradictories, pairs of
propositions in which the same thing is affirmed and denied of the same thing.
Since Aristotle seems to endorse (NC) without limitation not only in Meta-
physics Γ 3 but also in De Interpretatione 12 (21b18–19), Jones proposes what
he claims is a better understanding of Aristotle’s counterexample to (RCP) in
ch. 7. There is no such single thing as an indeterminate proposition, he says.
Rather, so-called “indeterminate propositions” are indeterminately universal
and particular. ‘Man is pale’ can be understood either as the universal claim
that all men are pale, or as the particular (better, partial) claim that some
men are pale. This is true even if we express indeterminate propositions more
explicitly in English as indefinite propositions: ‘A man is a rational animal’ is
naturally taken as universal; ‘A man is coming to fix the boiler’ more naturally
as particular.
Whitaker’s (and Jones’) interpretation of Aristotle’s project in chs. 7–9
is not uncontested. We find this already in Boethius. Summarising Aristotle’s
account of negation, opposition and contradiction in De Interpretatione ch. 6,
Boethius gives the essentially semantic definition of contradiction:
“Contradiction is then the opposition of an affirmation and a nega-
tion in which neither can both be false nor both true, but one is
always true the other false.”6
6Boethius [6, p. 88]. See Boethius [5, 134, 12–15]: Contradictio uero est oppositio affirma-
tionis et negationis, in qua neque ambas falsas neque ambas ueras esse contingit sed unam
semper ueram, alteram uero falsam.
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Subsequently, when presented with Aristotle’s claim in ch. 7 (18a11–12) that
“not every contradiction is true or false”, he is forced to deny that Aristotle
means what he says:
“He did not now mean contradiction in the proper sense but gener-
ally those which are opposites, either in a contrary or subcontrary
mode.”7
More recently, De Rijk [10, pp. 252–3] claims that Whitaker’s mistake is to
conflate contradictory pairs of assertibles, such as man’s being pale, man’s
not being pale, with assertions, such as ‘man is pale’, ‘man is not pale’. The
former pair can appear both to be true, but are in fact neither, since, not
being assertions, they are not apt to be true or false. De Rijk [10, p. 265] thus
categorically rejects the idea that Aristotle’s aim in chs.7–9 is to argue against
(RCP).
Moreover, if indeterminate propositions are ambiguous in the way Jones
claims, it is hard to see how Aristotle can claim that “the denial corresponding
to a single affirmation itself must be single as well.” (De Interpretatione 7,
17b37–38) Aristotle continues: “The denial, that is, must deny just the thing
the affirmation affirms of the selfsame, identical subject.” Both interpretations,
Whitaker’s and Jones’, strain credulity. After all, Jones’ interpretation only
yields a pair of contradictories both of which are true if one member is taken
universally and the other partially. Yet Whitaker’s seems to avoid clashing
with (NC) only by denying that the two propositions affirm and deny the same
thing of the same thing, namely, of the universal as a whole. In Whitaker’s
interpretation, the subjects are different, in Jones’s, the predicates.
Nonetheless, Aristotle concludes the chapter by saying:
“To sum up the foregoing statements, we showed that a single nega-
tion is opposed to a single affirmation in the manner we called con-
tradictory . . . We, moreover, have proved of two [contradictory] op-
posites [antiphases] that it is not the case always that one must be
true and one false.” [1, 7, 18a8–12]
So it is at least clear that Aristotle’s aim in ch. 7 is to question the universal
correctness of (RCP), even if the examples he gives are unconvincing. In ch.
8, Aristotle presents a further counterexample to (RCP), this time one where
the two contradictories are both false. It is a case of the fallacy of many
questions, which he also discusses in De Sophisticis Elenchis ch. 30. Suppose,
he says, that ‘cloak’ applies to both man and horse, in the sense that ‘Cloak
is pale’ means ‘Man and horse are pale’. Then its denial, ‘Cloak is not pale’,
is equivalent to ‘Man and horse are not pale’. If one is pale and other is not
pale, then both statements are false. A less unnatural example might be to ask
if humans give birth. Some do (women) and some don’t (men). So one cannot
agree that humans give birth, nor deny it. Both statements are false. There
is, as Aristotle says, “not a single affirmation” since “one name is given to
7Boethius [6, p. 110]. See Boethius [5, 176, 22–24]: Nunc contradictionem non illam proprie
sed communiter de his dixit quae sibi sunt oppositae siue contrario modo siue subcontrario.
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two things which do not make up one thing” (18a18). All he means by this, it
seems, is that they do not make up one thing as regards the particular question
at hand. As he remarks in De Sophisticis Elenchis, “a question must be single
to which there is a single answer” (181a31). But if one is asked ‘Are Coriscus
and Callias at home or not at home?’ (176a7), no single answer is possible, if
one is and the other is not; and even if they both are (or are not), giving a
single answer can be unclear. Nonetheless, in De Interpretatione 8, Aristotle’s
contradictory pair refers to a single syntactic denial, which he thinks shows
that (RCP) is not universally true.
Jones also questions Whitaker’s interpretation of Aristotle’s reasoning
in ch. 9, though he again agrees with Whitaker that Aristotle’s aim is to
give further examples where (RCP) fails. This is obscured, they both say, by
treating ch. 9 in isolation, as so often happens. But seen in the context of
chs. 6–8 (and the chapters that follow) it becomes clear that (RCP) is the
focus, even though (BV) is involved. Ch. 8, offering, as we have seen, further
counterexamples to (RCP), closes with the words:
“And accordingly not even here is one necessarily true and one false
of two statements opposed contradictorily,” [1, 18a27]
and ch. 9 continues:
“In regard to things present or past . . . of those contradictorily
opposed one, again, must be true and one false, when they have
a universal for subject and are in themselves universal . . . This
need not, however, be so in the case of two such propositions as
have universals for subjects but are not themselves universals.” [1,
18a28–32]
(That was the upshot of ch. 7.) Now comes the topic of ch. 9:
“When, however, we come to propositions whose subjects are sin-
gular terms, while their predicates refer to the future and not to
the present or past, then we find that the case is quite changed.” [1,
18a33–5]
Recall that (RCP) is about contradictory pairs of propositions, whereas (BV)
is about single propositions. The argument of ch. 9 is a reductio ad absurdum.
Whitaker and Jones claim that the premise of the reductio, the claim to be
rejected, is (RCP), not (BV), that is, a claim about a contradictory pair, that
one is true, the other false, not the claim that a single proposition is true
or false. Aristotle argues that (RCP) leads to unacceptable conclusions. He
writes:
“These and other strange consequences follow provided we assume
in the case of a pair of contradictory opposites . . . that one must
be true, the other false,” [1, 18b26]
and he concludes:
“There is evidently, then, no necessity that one should be true, the
other false, in the case of affirmations and denials. For the case
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of those things which as yet are potential, not actually existent, is
different from that of things actual.” [1, 19a39-b3]
Aristotle infers that (RCP) fails for future contingents. Whitaker and Jones
disagree, however, about his commitment to (BV) about them. (BV) is a claim
about a single proposition, e.g., ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’. If he
denies (BV), as Jones claims, we have a simple explanation of the failure of
(RCP), since as we noted, (RCP) entails (BV). However, Whitaker [32, p. 125]
claims that Aristotle is elsewhere committed to (BV), and never questions it
in ch. 9. He is left with the difficult task of explaining how each member of
the contradictory pair is true or false, by (BV), but in such a way that (RCP)
fails. His answer is that they are true or false, but not determinately either,
so that the question of which cannot be answered in a dialectical dispute. No
determinate answer can be given in advance.
In sum, Whitaker’s claim that Aristotle challenges (RCP) in De Interpre-
tatione has some textual support, but Aristotle’s counterexamples are neither
clear nor convincing. Swyneshed will present a perhaps clearer example in his
treatment of the logical paradoxes.
2. Swyneshed’s Third Thesis
So let us return to Swyneshed’s third thesis, and consider his argument for it.
At the end of his treatise on insolubles, Roger writes:
“If in these remarks what is perfect or consonant with truth was
found, it was gathered from the sayings of Aristotle and of other
revered masters. If what was imperfect or dissonant with the truth
is found, its insufficiency should be impugned only to me. So be it.”8
Indeed, Roger considers explicitly the objection that
“in the first book of De Interpretatione and in the first book of the
Posterior Analytics and in many other places . . . Aristotle indicates
that two contradictories cannot be false together, and 〈the third
thesis〉 claims this, and so it is false.”9
His reply is that by ‘false’ here Aristotle means
“what signifies other than it is . . . except in the case of insolubles
where he understands by ‘false’ not what signifies other than it is
but what undermines itself, that is, falsifies itself, as, e.g., is clear
8Spade [29, §112, p. 220], reprinted in Spade [31]: In istis autem si quid completum sive ver-
itati consonum repertum fuerit, ex dictis Aristotelis et aliorum reverendorum magistrorum
colligitur. Si quid diminutum aut veritati dissonum inveniatur, soli meae insufficientiae est
impugnandum. Amen. Translations from Spade [29] are my own.
9Spade [29, §38, p. 193]: Contra ultimam conclusionem sic arguitur per Aristotelem in primo
Periermeneias et in primo Posteriorum et in multis aliis locis. Videtur quod Aristoteles
innuat quod duo contradictoria non possunt simul esse falsa; et illa hoc ponit; igitur, ipsa
est falsa.
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in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, where the text says: “But it
happens in all such cases that they undermine themselves.”10
Spade refers the reader to Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ 8 (1012b15 ff.):
“All such theses end up notoriously by eliminating themselves; for
anyone who says that everything is true also makes the statement
contrary to his own true (for the contrary statement asserts that his
is not true).”11
Not all Roger’s contemporaries were persuaded by his response, however.
Twenty-five years later, Ralph Strode wrote, concerning Roger’s first thesis
(that a false proposition can signify as it is) in particular:
“It seems to be quite expressly contrary to age-old principles passed
down by the most highly regarded philosophers and familiar to the
whole community of moderns without any question or doubt and
especially contrary to Aristotle’s principles in the first book of De
Interpretatione, the first book of the Prior Analytics, the first book
of the Topics and the fourth book of the Metaphysics.”12
and he aims similar criticism at the second and third theses. But if Whitaker
and Jones are right, Roger is in agreement with Aristotle. Pairs of contradic-
tories do not necessarily have opposite truth-values. Indeed, according to the
third thesis there is a pair of contradictories both of which are false. Roger’s
example is the simple Liar paradox: ‘This is false’, referring to itself. The usual
argument to a paradox runs as follows. If it were true, assuming it signifies
only that it is false, and that a proposition is true just when it signifies as it
is, it would be false and so not true. So it is false. But if it is false, it signifies
other than it is, by the usual account of falsehood, so it is not false but true.
We have shown that it is true if and only if it is false, and so by reductio ad
absurdum, it is both true and false.
Roger’s solution to the paradox is to strengthen the condition for truth
and correspondingly weaken that for falsehood. Some propositions, he notes,
are relevant to inferring their own falsehood, and so they could be said to
falsify themselves even if they otherwise signify as it is. So a proposition is
false, he said, not only if it is not as it signifies, but also if it falsifies itself.
Correspondingly, it is true only if it not only signifies as it is, but does not
10Spade [29, §39, p. 194]: illud fore falsum quod significat aliter quam est—nisi in materia
insolubilium ubi intellegit per ‘falsum’ non tale quod significat aliter quam est sed tale quod
est destruens se, id est, falsificans, sicut per eum patet quarto Melaphysicae, ubi dicit textus
sic “Accidit autem omnibus talibus destruere se ipsas”.
11Aristotle [2, p. 26]. William of Moerbeke’s medieval Latin translation, which Swyneshed is
quoting, reads [3]: Accidit itaque et quod famatum est de omnibus talibus orationibus, ipsas
se ipsas destruere. Nam qui omnia vera dicit orationis sue contrariam veram facit, quare
suam non veram; contraria enim non dicit ipam esse veram.
12Spade [28, p. 76]: . . . videtur satis expresse esse contra antiqua principia a philosophis
maxime approbatis tradita et a tota communitate modernorum sine aliqua inquisitione seu
dubitatione vsitata, et precipue contra principia Aristotelis primo Peryerminias et primo
Priorum et primo Topicorum et quarto Methaphisice. Translations from Spade [28] are my
own.
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falsify itself. The simple Liar is, accordingly, simply false, since it falsifies itself.
The first thesis records this: here is a false proposition, ‘This is false’, which
signifies as it is. How does it falsify itself? By the simple fact that from what
it signifies, namely that it is false, it directly follows that it is false. In general:
“Some propositions falsify themselves indirectly, some directly. A
proposition falsifying itself indirectly is a proposition signifying prin-
cipally as it is or other than it is and that, so signifying, falsifies
another proposition falsifying it . . . A proposition falsifying itself
directly is a proposition signifying principally as it is or other than
it is, relevant to inferring itself to be false. And it is of two kinds.
Some are relevant sufficiently, some are relevant insufficiently. Rel-
evant sufficiently are propositions signifying principally as it is or
other than it is from which, signifying in this way, it directly follows
or is apt to follow that they are false. An example: let the proposi-
tion ‘This is false’ signify principally that this is false, referring to
itself. Then it directly follows ‘This is false, therefore, this is false’.
And in this way it is relevant sufficiently to inferring itself to be
false. A proposition relevant insufficiently . . . is a proposition sig-
nifying as it is from which, signifying in that way, with its being
wholly as it is, it follows in reality or is apt to follow that it itself
is false and without this addition that does not follow. An exam-
ple: suppose that there is only one Socrates and that only he says
‘Socrates says a falsehood’ and that it principally signifies by impo-
sition that Socrates says a falsehood. Then it follows: Socrates says
a falsehood, and only he says ‘Socrates says a falsehood’, therefore it
is false. And it is relevant to inferring in that scenario that ‘Socrates
says a falsehood’ signifies principally as it is.’13
From here, the proof of Roger’s third thesis is fairly immediate. ‘This is
false’ signifies of itself that it is false. To contradict this, we take the proposition
13Spade [29, §§4–8, pp. 182–4]: Quaedam falsificat se mediate, quaedam immediate. Propo-
sitio falsificans se mediate est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam
est et ipsa sic significando falsificat propositionem aliam a se falsificantem se . . .
Propositio falsificans se immediate est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel
aliter quam est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsam. Et illa est duplex. Quaedam
est pertinens sufficiens, quaedam est pertinens insufficiens. Pertinens sufficiens est propo-
sitio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est ex qua sic significando immediate
sequitur vel est natum sequi ipsam fore falsam. Exemplum: Significet illa propositio ‘Hoc est
falsum’ principaliter quod hoc est falsum, ipsamet demonstrata. Tunc sequitur immediate
‘Hoc est falsum; igitur, hoc est falsum’. Et sic illa est pertinens sufficiens ad inferendum
se ipsam fore falsam.
Propositio pertinens insufficiens . . . est propositio significans sicut est ex qua sic
significando cum totaliter sic esse sicut est ex parte rei sequitur vel natum est sequi ipsam
fore falsam et ex ita esse sine illa non sequitur illud. Exemplum: Ponatur quod tantum
sit unus Sortes et quod solum dicat illam ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ et quod illa ex impositione
principaliter significet quod Sortes dicit falsum. Tunc sequitur: Sortes dicit falsum et solum
dicit illam ‘Sortes dicit falsum’, igitur illa est falsa. Et illa est pertinens ad inferendum
cum casu posito quod illa ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ significat principaliter sicut est.
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which denies of that first proposition that it is false, namely, ‘That is not
false’, referring by ‘that’ to ‘This is false’. Then clearly ‘This is false’ is false
because it falsifies itself, and ‘That is not false’ is false because it signifies other
than it is, namely, that the false proposition ‘This is false’ is not false. Two
contradictories are at the same time false.
All Ralph Strode can find to say in response to this is to repeat his claim
that it is contrary to Aristotle’s teaching:
“The opposite of [the conclusion that two contradictories mutually
contradicting each other are at the same time false] is clear by Aris-
totle in the Postpredicaments, in the fourth book of the Metaphysics
and in the first book of the Perihermeneias, where he quite expressly
insists that it is impossible that two contradictories mutually con-
tradicting one another are at the same time true or at the same time
false.”14
In a similar way, Robert Eland [28, p. 65] simply describes Roger’s conclu-
sion as “impossible” and splutters that “these conclusions are contrary to the
opinion of many of the wise”.15 But William Heytesbury [12, pp. 26–27] does
try to provide an argument against Roger’s position.16 To do so, he takes the
proposition ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’, call it A, assuming it
to signify only that A signifies other than it is. Next, take another proposition,
B, which signifies just as A does, namely, that A signifies other than it is. Now
either A signifies wholly as it is, or not. William’s idea is to derive a contradic-
tion from each leg of this disjunction using only principles that Roger endorses.
So first, suppose that it is not wholly as A signifies, that is, A signifies other
than it is. Since B signifies that A signifies other than it is, and only that, it
is as B signifies. Moreover, A signifies exactly as B does, so it is as A signifies,
contradicting our assumption that it was not wholly as A signifies.
On the other hand, suppose it is wholly as A signifies. Let C be the
contradictory of B, that is, let C deny of A whatever B affirms of A. So C
signifies that A does not signify other than it is, that is, that A signifies as
it is. Then C is true, for we have assumed that it is as A signifies, and C
does not falsify itself. Moreover, B and C are contradictories, so B is false.
(Here, William correctly assumes that Roger does not think that a pair of
contradictories can both be true, even if he believes that they can both be
false.) Moreover, B does not falsify itself either, so B must signify other than
it is. Since A signifies exactly as B does, and B signifies that A signifies other
than it is, it follows that A must signify other than it is, contradicting our
assumption that it was wholly as A signifies. So either way, Roger’s theory
leads to contradiction.
14Spade [28, pp. 76–7]: Oppositum . . . patet per Aristotelem in Postpredicamentis et quarto
Metaphisice et primo Peryermenias, ubi satis expresse vult quod impossibile est duo con-
tradictoria sibi invicem contradicentia esse simul vera vel simul falsa.
15[28, p. 68]: Istae conclusiones sunt contra opinionem plurium sapientium. On the identity
of Robert Eland, called ‘Fland’ by Spade, see Read and Thakkar [27].
16For the Latin text, see Pozzi [22, p. 218].
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In his treatise on ‘Insolubles’, the final treatise of his Logica Magna, Paul
of Venice presents and defends a theory of insolubles in many ways similar
to Roger’s. He then considers a succession of arguments against the theory,
rehearsing each of William’s objections in turn, including that deriving a con-
tradiction from supposing that ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’
either signifies other than it is or not. He offers two responses to the objection.
His first is this:
“To the second argument, I say, accepting the scenario, that it is not
wholly as A signifies, and so consequently, I grant that A signifies
other than it is. And then 〈in reply〉 to the argument: ‘A signifies
other than it is, and B signifies only that A signifies other than it
is, therefore it is wholly as B signifies’: I grant the inference and the
conclusion; and then 〈in reply〉 to the argument: ‘It is wholly as B
signifies and the proposition A wholly signifies as B does and vice
versa, therefore it is wholly as A signifies’: I deny the inference, but
one would need to add in the premise that it is not inconsistent that
A is true, and this I deny. For A falsifies itself, because it asserts
itself to signify other than it is, and this is why it is inconsistent for
A to be true.”17
Thus Paul believes that the proposition in question, A, is an insoluble, and so
falsifies itself in signifying other than it is. We have a Moorean paradox: if I
say ‘This very proposition is false’, or ‘This proposition signifies other than it
is’, I may also immediately say correctly, ‘and what I just said was false’.18
Paul subsequently proposes a different solution to the first three objec-
tions (of William’s) that he considers:
“But one can respond to all these 〈arguments〉 in another way, al-
ways admitting the scenario, by denying both contradictories, namely,
‘It is as Socrates says it is’, ‘It is not as Socrates says it is’; ‘It is as A
signifies’, ‘It is not as A signifies’; ‘Some proposition signifies other
than it is’, ‘No proposition signifies other than it is’. For just as it is
not impossible for two contradictories to be false at the same time
in the case of insolubles, so it is not impossible for the same thing
to be denied at the same time in the same case, and especially when
17Paulus Venetus [20, f. 196rb] corrected against manuscript Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana
lat.2132, f. 241ra: Ad secundam rationem dico admisso casu quod non est ita totaliter sicut a
significat, et ita consequenter concedo quod a significat aliter quam est. Et tunc ad argumen-
tum: a propositio significat aliter quam est et b significat solummodo quod a significat aliter
quam est, igitur ita est totaliter sicut b significat: concedo consequentiam et consequens;
et tunc ad argumentum: ita est totaliter sicut b significat et a propositio totaliter significat
sicut b et econtra, igitur ita est totaliter sicut a significat: nego consequentiam, sed deberet
addi in antecedente quod non repugnat a esse verum et hoc negatur. Unde a falsificat se ex
quo asserit se significare aliter quam est, quare repugnat a esse verum. (Text and trans-
lation from Paul’s treatise on ‘Insolubles’ are from an edition currently in preparation by
Barbara Bartocci and myself.)
18Moore’s paradox [see, e.g., [18]] is the apparent absurdity of making an assertion of the
form ‘p but I don’t believe that p’.
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the insolubles principally have reflection on their own signification,
as experience has taught in the foregoing arguments.”19
This is to deny both that A signifies as it is and that A signifies other than it
is. It is a denial of (EM), and consequently of (BV).
This is in fact how Roger himself would deal with the paradox, as we
will see. One might wonder, however, whether it is a coherent response from
Paul. Does he really accept this alternative response, or is he simply including
it in deference to Roger? The problem arises because Paul’s account of truth,
though obviously inspired by Roger’s, is somewhat different. Paul writes:
“A true proposition is one whose exact significate is true and 〈for
which〉 it is not inconsistent that the proposition is true. This is clear
from what has been said in the treatise ‘On the truth and falsity of
propositions. . . A false proposition is one which either falsifies itself
or whose falsity does not arise from its terms, but from its false
exact significate.”20
Talk of the “exact significate” (significatum adequatum) is found in many four-
teenth-century authors, notably Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly, from
whom Paul took it.21 Gregory uses the term to denote the object of demon-
strative knowledge, the famous complexe significabile, what is signified com-
plexly, namely, by propositions. Paul adapts Gregory’s theory in a radical way,
claiming that the “exact significate” of a subject-predicate proposition is the
exact significate of its subject or predicate:
“For any true affirmative present-tense proposition that has no am-
pliative verb or a term that is somehow distracting, the exact sig-
nificate of the subject or of the predicate is really identical with its
principal significate.”22
Thus, whereas for Gregory and others what is complexly signifiable has itself
some real propositional complexity, for Paul it has it only formally, even though
in reality, it is identical to the exact significate of the subject or predicate:
19Paulus Venetus [20, f. 196rb, BAV lat.2132, f. 241ra]: Potest tamen ad hec omnia aliter
responderi negando semper admisso casu utrumque contradictorium, videlicet: ita est sicut
sortes dicit, non est ita sicut sortes dicit; ita est sicut a significat, non est ita sicut a signi-
ficat; aliqua propositio significat aliter quam est, nulla propositio significat aliter quam est.
Sicut enim non est inconveniens duo contraditoria esse simul falsa in materia insolubilium
ita non est inconveniens eadem simul negari in eadem materia, et precipue quando insol-
ubilia habent principaliter reflexionem ad significationem propriam, ut in predictis motivis
experientia docuit.
20Paulus Venetus [20, f. 194vb, BAV lat.2132, f. 239rb]: Propositio vera est illa cuius ad-
equatum significatum est verum et non repugnat ipsam esse veram. Patet ex dictis in de
veritate et falsitate propositionum . . . propositio falsa dicitur esse illa que falsificat se, aut
cuius falsitas non consurgit ex terminis sed ex adequato significato falso. See also Paulus
Venetus [21, pp. 62].
21See Conti [8, p. 474] and Nuchelmans [19, p. 231].
22Paulus Venetus [21, p. 166]: Quarta conclusio . . . cuiuslibet propositionis verae et affir-
mativae de praesenti sine verbo ampliativo aut termino distrahente aliqualiter, adaequatum
significatum subiecti aut praedicati principali significato est communicabile identice realiter.
Translations from Paulus Venetus [21] are my own.
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“What is exactly and complexly signifiable by any proposition and
has a place in reality, is somehow distinct from what is stateable and
non-complexly signifiable by its subject or predicate. . . . that God
exists is formally distinct from God . . . These notions are distinct,
but not really distinct, therefore, formally distinct . . . There is a
formal distinction between those signifiable by a complex and those
signifiable by a non-complex.”23
To say that two notions are formally distinct means that though the things
signified are the same, the terms expressing one notion cannot always be sub-
stituted salva veritate for the other.
3. Truth and Signification
Nonetheless, Paul’s account of truth and falsity is puzzling: a proposition’s
truth was linked in the above passage to the truth of its exact significate, and
the same for falsehood. But when is the exact significate true, and what does
its truth consist in?
Conti [9, §3] claims that Paul inverts the order of explanation followed
by Gregory:
“Paul deals with the question of the truth and falsity of a proposition
before examining the problem of its meaning, and solves the latter
on the basis of the answer to the former.”24
Paul does indeed place his treatise on truth and falsity in the Logica Magna
before that on the significate of the proposition, so that he addresses the
question of the truth and falsity of propositions before turning to the problem
of meaning. At the end of that earlier treatise Paul connects the truth of the
proposition with that of its exact significate, so leading into the subsequent
discussion of its exact significate. Paul’s first thesis in his account of truth
reads:
“If the exact significate of a proposition is true and it is not incon-
sistent that the proposition, thus exactly signifying, should be true,
then the proposition is true.”25
The preceding discussion in this treatise, however, consists entirely of refuta-
tion of other accounts of truth. There is no preceding account of the truth of
propositions that is endorsed and accepted by Paul, other than the connection
with the exact significate.
23Paulus Venetus [21, pp. 156–8]: Cuiuslibet propositionis adaequate complexe significabile
quod in natura ponitur a suo incomplexe significabili per subiectum vel praedicatum enuntia-
bile aliqualiter distinguitur. . . . [F]ormaliter distinguitur . . . Deus a Deum esse. . . . [E]st
distinctio formalis . . . inter complexe et incomplexe significabilia.
24See also Conti [8, p. 483].
25Paulus Venetus [21, p. 62]: Prima 〈conclusio〉 est si alicuius propositionis significatum
adaequatum est verum, et non repugnat illam propositionem esse veram, sic significando
adaequate, illa propositio est vera.
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Although Paul states, in his second thesis, that if a proposition is true,
so too is its exact significate,26 he also believes that its exact significate can
be true even if the proposition itself is false because it falsifies itself. In that
case, however, the truth of the significate cannot be grounded on that of the
proposition. Take ‘This proposition is both true and false’, for example. Its
exact significate is false, whereas the exact significate of ‘This proposition
is false’ is true, and they both falsify themselves. So the truth of the exact
significate of a proposition cannot be defined in terms of the truth or falsity
of the proposition itself. Conti is right when he writes that all non-insoluble
propositions “are true if and only if what they signify is true and false if and
only if what they signify is false.”27 However, Paul includes ‘This proposition
is both true and false’ as an insoluble, for it implies its own falsity:
“An insoluble proposition is a proposition having reflection on itself
wholly or partially implying its own falsity or that it is not itself
true.”28
So the truth or falsity of the exact significate of insoluble propositions cannot
be grounded on that of the insoluble proposition itself. The insoluble propo-
sition is always false. But sometimes its exact significate is true, sometimes
false.
The order of the treatises can, moreover, be explained consistently with
solving the problem of truth on the basis of the theory of meaning: having found
all other accounts of truth wanting, Paul proposes his own, which defines the
truth of the proposition in terms of the truth of its significate (taking the first
thesis at face value); that then serves to motivate the following treatise, on the
significate of the proposition.
Recall from §2 above that Paul takes the exact significate of a proposi-
tion to be the exact significate of its subject (or predicate), but described in
propositional terms, e.g., not just God, but God as that God exists (formally
distinct from God, but really identical). That is, the exact significate (God, or
a man), considered as the significate, is itself a truth or a falsehood.
One may be reminded here of a distinction made by David Armstrong
in his book, A World of States of Affairs (1997), between the thin and the
thick particular. The thin particular is an abstraction, considered shorn of all
its properties; the thick particular is “the particular taken along with all and
only the particular’s non-relational properties.”29 As such,
“Quineans . . . do have a truthmaker (if they want it!) for truths that
ascribe properties to a particular. The truthmaker is the particular
itself. The particular would have to be what has just been called
26Paulus Venetus [21, p. 62]: Secunda conclusio: Si aliqua propositio est vera, aliqualiter
esse adaequate significans, suum adaequatum significatum est verum.
27Conti [8, p. 487], referring to Paulus Venetus [21, p. 64].
28Paulus Venetus [20, f. 194vb, BAV lat.2132, f. 239ra]: Propositio insolubilis est propositio
habens supra se reflexionem sue falsitatis aut se non esse veram, totaliter vel partialiter
illativa.
29Armstrong [4, p. 124].
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the thick particular, and, indeed, the thick particular would be a
suitable truthmaker. Perhaps this accounts, or helps to account, for
the feeling among those philosophers who take the Quinean position
that they have left nothing out. Their feeling is justified. But if our
argument is on the right lines, then though it is true that they have
left nothing out, their truthmaker is really a state of affairs .”
This is not quite Paul’s view ( Armstrong continues: “their truthmaker is really
a state of affairs”), ascribing propositional complexity to the particular, which
we have seen Paul denies, at least in reality. Nor are Paul’s exact significates
as thick as the thick particular, which includes all its non-relational properties.
But considered formally, as a significate, each exact significate is in itself true
or false. That is where the regress is stopped.
Such an account as Paul’s is definitely realist, postulating a real (albeit,
non-propositional) correlate to every significant proposition. The consequence
is that Paul appears to be committed to (BV) and (EM) where Roger is not.30
Talk of the significate of the proposition does not occur in Roger, where instead
he talks of “signifying principally”. By the principal signification (Roger) and
the exact signification (Paul) each means what the whole proposition signifies
but ignoring any secondary or consequential signification.31 Maieru` [17, pp.
490] cites Strode’s Consequentiae as saying:
“A grammatical indicative utterance exactly significative of truth
or falsity is called a proposition. And what results exactly from all
the significations of its immediate verbal parts is called the exact or
principal or total signification of the proposition.”32
In contrast to Paul’s, Roger’s account of truth and falsehood, though described
in terms of how a proposition principally signifies, does not appeal to any
corresponding true or false entity or significate:
“There follow four definitions or descriptions. The first is this: a
proposition is a congruent indicative utterance significative either
naturally or by an imposition by which it was last imposed to signify
complexly.
The second is this: a true proposition is a proposition not fal-
sifying itself signifying principally as it is either naturally or by an
imposition by which it was last imposed to signify.
Third definition: a false proposition is an utterance falsifying
itself or an utterance not falsifying itself signifying principally other
30But see Hanke [11], who elaborates a non-bivalent semantics for Paul’s and Roger’s
theories.
31See, e.g., Spade [30, p. 106].
32Et oratio indicativa congrua veri vel falsi adaequate significativa dicitur propositio. Et
dicitur adaequata vel principalis vel totalis significatio propositionis quae resultat adaequate
ex omnibus significationibus suarum partium propinquarum quae sunt dictiones. (My own
translation.) Note, however, that although Paul’s exact and Roger’s principal signification
may be the same, Paul believes that the total signification is greater than its exact signifi-
cation. See Paulus Venetus [21, ‘On the Significatum of a Proposition’, thesis 3: p. 192].
S. Read Log. Univers.
than it is either naturally or by an imposition by which it was last
imposed to signify.
The fourth is this: an insoluble as put forward is a proposition
signifying principally as it is or other than it is which is relevant to
inferring itself to be false or unknown or not believed, and so on.”33
One might think that this rules out a proposition’s being neither true nor
false. However, Roger points out right at the start of his treatise that there is
a third option:
“A proposition neither signifying principally as it is nor other than
it is, that is, which is neither true nor false, is a proposition sig-
nifying in some way and that so signifying is relevant to inferring
itself not to signify principally as it is, for example, the proposition
‘This proposition does not signify as it is’, referring to itself, which
principally signifies that it itself does not signify as it is. And this
similarly, ‘Every proposition signifies other than it is’, which prin-
cipally signifies that every proposition signifies other than it is.”34
The equation of ‘neither signifying as it is nor other than it is’ with ‘that is,
is neither true nor false’ occurs in only one manuscript.35 But it is borne out
by later remarks, in particular, an objection which Roger considers. It runs:
“One argues against these proposals in many ways. First, like this:
one of those proposals claims that some proposition is neither true
nor false, which is contrary to Aristotle in the Categories where he
says in one place: “Now it seems that every affirmation is true or
false”,36 from which it follows that every affirmative is true or false.
And if this is true of these affirmatives, for the same reason it will
be true of negatives.”37
33Spade [29, §§13–16, pp. 185–6]: Post illa sequuntur quattuor diffinitiones seu descrip-
tiones. Prima est haec: propositio est oratio indicativa congrua naturaliter, ex impositione,
vel impositionibus qua vel quibus ultimo fuit imposita complexe ad significandum significa-
tiva. Secunda est haec: propositio vera est propositio non falsificans se principaliter sicut
est significans naturaliter aut ex impositione vel impositionibus qua vel quibus ultimo fuit
imposita ad significandum. Tertia definitio: propositio falsa est oratio falsificans se vel ora-
tio non falsificans se principaliter aliter quam est significans naturaliter, ex impositione,
vel impositionibus qua vel quibus ultimo fuit imposita ad significandum. Quarta est haec:
insolubile ad propositum est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est
pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsam vel nescitam vel 〈non〉creditam, et sic de
singulis. (‘non’ is added in that final clause at the suggestion of Pozzi [22, p. 182].)
34Spade [29, §2, pp. 180–1]: Propositio nec principaliter significans sicut est nec aliter quam
est, id est, quae nec est vera nec falsa, est propositio significans aliqualiter esse et illa
sic significando est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam non significare principaliter sicut est,
sicut haec propositio ‘Haec propositio non significat sicut est’, demonstrata illa eadem, quae
principaliter significet quod ipsa non significat sicut est. Et haec similiter ‘Omnis propositio
significat aliter quam est’ quae principaliter significet quod omnis propositio significat aliter
quam est.
35See Spade [29, p. 180 n.27].
36Spade refers to Categories 4, 2a6–7.
37Spade [29, §28, p. 190]: Contra illas propositiones arguitur multipliciter. Primo sic: una
illarum propositionum ponit aliquam propositionem fore nec veram nec falsam, quod est
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Roger responds:
“Where Aristotle claims authoritatively,“Now it seems” etc., he
means to draw a distinction between propositions and the incom-
plex terms from which propositions are composed. Therefore, his
point is that every truth or falsehood is an affirmative or negative
proposition. And it follows that no incomplex term is true or false.
Thus the first appeal to authority is accommodated. . . .
It should be understood that every proposition signifying prin-
cipally as it is or other than it is, whether it is of the present or the
past or the future tense, whether of necessity or of contingency,
whose truth depends on the present, is either true or false and no
others. From this it is clear that there are many propositions which
are neither true nor false, such as ‘This signifies other than it is’,
referring to itself and principally signifying in that way, ‘You will
be dead tomorrow’, and universally all propositions of future con-
tingency whose truth does not depend on the present,”38
alluding specifically to Aristotle’s apparent rejection of (BV) in De Interpre-
tatione ch. 9.
In fact, although ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’ is the first
problematic example which Roger mentions in his ‘Insolubles’ (§3, p. 181), he
goes on to claim that it is in fact not an insoluble, for it does not falsify itself,
and is not false:
“It remains to solve some sophisms which appear to be insolubles
but are not, e.g., ‘A is known’, ‘This proposition signifies other than
it is’, ‘That proposition does not signify other than it is’, ‘This
proposition does not signify as it is’, and similar ones.”39
‘This proposition signifies other than it is’ should be denied, Roger says. It
doesn’t signify other than it is, nor as it is. It doesn’t signify as it is, for if
Footnote 37 continued
contra Aristotelem in Praedicamenlis ubi dicit in uno loco sic: “Videtur autem omnis affir-
matio vera vel falsa”. Ex qua sequitur quod omnis affirmativa est vera vel falsa. Et si hoc
est verum de istis affirmativis, eadem ratione erit verum de negativis.
38Spade [29, §§30–2, p. 190–1]: Ubi Aristoteles ponit illam auctoritatem, “Videtur autem,”
et cetera, intendit ponere differentiam inter propositiones et incomplexa ex quibus compo-
nuntur propositiones. Differentia igitur sua est quod omne verum vel falsum est propositio
affirmativa vel negativa. Et sequitur quod nullum incomplexum est verum vel falsum. Et
sic salvatur prima auctoritas . . . Pro quo est sciendum quod omnis propositio significans
principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est sive sit de praesenti sive de praeterito sive de
futuro, sive de necessaria sive de contingenti, cujus veritas dependet a praesenti est vera
vel falsa et nulla alia. Ex quo patet quod multae sunt propositiones quae nec sunt verae nec
falsae cujusmodi sunt illae ‘Haec significat aliter quam est’, eadem demonstrata sic princi-
paliter significante, ‘Tu eris mortuus cras’, et universaliter omnes propositiones de futuro
contingenti quarum veritas non dependet a praesenti.
39Spade [29, §100, p. 215]: . . . superest solvere quaedam sophismata quae apparent insolu-
bilia et non sunt, sicut sint ‘a est scitum’, ‘Ista propositio significat aliter quam est’, ‘Illa
propositio non significat aliter quam est’, ‘Ista propositio non significat sicut est’, et his
similes.
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it did, it wouldn’t, and so by the usual reductio argument, it doesn’t. But if
it doesn’t, it is tempting to argue for a contradiction as follows: if it doesn’t
signify other than it is, then it must signify as it is, since it does signify in
some complex way. But if so, then it must signify other than it is, for that is
what it signifies. That move is invalid, Roger says. For recall the discussion
of signifying from the start of the treatise: some propositions signify as it is,
others other than it is, and yet others neither as it is nor other than it is. That
last group consists of those that signify in some complex way but, signifying in
that way, are relevant to inferring themselves not to signify as it is. That is the
case with ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’, for we can immediately
infer from the proposition’s signifying other than it is that it doesn’t signify
as it is. So it does not follow from the fact that it doesn’t signify other than it
is that it signifies as it is, even though what it signifies is that it signifies other
than it is.
Recall Heytesbury’s argument. It was premised on the assumption that
either a proposition signifies as it is or not (given that it signifies in some way).
Roger simply denies that basic assumption of (EM) and the instance of (BV)
that goes with it. However, one might question whether Roger’s rejection of
(EM) is really open to Paul, given his much more strongly realist account of
truth.
Roger considers a final objection: his proposed solution means that “there
are two mutually contradictory contradictories one of which signifies as it is
while the other does not signify other than it is.”40 Take B: ‘A does not signify
other than it is’, the contradictory of A: ‘This proposition signifies other than
it is’. Then B signifies as it is, while, as we have seen, A does not signify
other than it is (or as it is, for that matter). For B is not relevant to inferring
that it does not itself signify as it is, whereas A is. So indeed, the opponent is
right, and we have a further thesis, parallel to Roger’s third thesis, and again
contradicting (RCP).
In fact, B is true, so Roger is indeed committed to the thesis Eland levels
at him as an objection,41 and as elaborated by Strode:
“The sixth conclusion is this, that there are two contradictories of
which one is true and the other neither signifies as it is nor other
than it is, and in consequence, according to [Roger’s] opinion, neither
true nor false . . . And that this thesis is unacceptable is clear enough
according to Aristotle in the Postpredicaments, and the first book
of De Interpretatione, where he quite expressly insists that if one of
contradictories is true the other is false, and vice versa.”42
40Spade [29, §105, p. 218]: aliqua sunt duo contradictoria sibi invicem contradicentia et
unum illorum significat sicut est et aliud non significat aliter quam est.
41See [28, p. 65] and Read and Thakkar [27, p. 169].
42Spade [28, p. 78–9], corrected against manuscript Erfurt Amploniana Q255: Sexta conclu-
sio est ista, quod aliqua sunt duo contradictoria, quorum unum est verum et reliquum nec
significans sicud est nec aliter quam est, et per consequens secundum istam opinionem
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But as we have seen, this is arguably not contrary to Aristotle’s account of con-
tradictories in the De Interpretatione but, according to Whitaker and Jones,
very much in accord with it.
4. Negation and Denial
What is the contemporary relevance of these reflections? On the semantic
account of contradictories, whereby pairs of contradictories must have opposite
truth-value, it might seem impossible for there to be true contradictions, pairs
of contradictories both of which are true, or both false. But that they are not
both is a Gricean implicature, as mentioned earlier. Indeed, by (RCP), or even
by a weak form of (RCP) which says that if one of the pair is true the other
false and vice versa, if both are false then both are true. This weak form of
(RCP) is compatible with their lacking truth-value altogether and with their
both being both true and false. But it is not compatible with Swyneshed’s
third thesis, their both being false and not true, nor with Aristotle’s claims in
chs. 7–8 of De Interpretatione, at least.
On the syntactic account, however, whereby one member of each con-
tradictory pair denies what the other affirms, numerous counterexamples to
(RCP) are to be found, notably among the logical paradoxes, according to some
medieval responses to the insolubles. Indeed, there seem to be counterexamples
even to (EM) and (BV).
Graham Priest is a Roger Swyneshed for our own times, with his own
iconoclastic thesis:
“Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true: there are
sentences (statements, propositions, or whatever one takes truth-
bearers to be), α, such that both α and ¬α are true, that is, such
that α is both true and false.”43
Here ¬α is the negation of α. Priest [24, p. 70] rejects the principle that the
truth of ¬α excludes the truth of α. Indeed, he equates the falsehood of α with
the truth of ¬α.
But care is needed here in identifying ¬α. Priest [23, p. 76 n.2] refers
us to Priest [25, §7.2], where he describes Aristotle’s account of negation as
being encapsulated in the square of opposition. That is only part of the story,
Aristotle’s account as applied specifically to the A, E, I and O forms of subject-
predicate propositions. Such propositions are not among those which Aristotle
claims as counterexamples to (RCP). Aristotle seems to accept (RCP) for the
particular and universal propositions one finds in the Square of Opposition.44
But even here, Swyneshed’s solution to the Liar provides counterexamples.
Footnote 42 continued
nec 〈est〉 verum nec falsum . . . Et quod ista conclusio sit inconveniens satis patet per Aris-
totelem in Postpredicamentis et primo Peryerminias, ubi satis expresse vult 〈quod〉 si unum
contradictoriorum sit 〈verum〉, reliquum est falsum, et e converso.
43Priest [23, p. 1].
44See De Interpretatione 7, 17b17–21.
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Suppose, to take a medieval example, God has annihilated all particular af-
firmative propositions apart from ‘Some particular affirmative is false’. Then
that proposition, being the only particular affirmative proposition, falsifies it-
self, and so on Swyneshed’s account is false. But ‘No particular affirmative
is false’ is also false, for there is a false particular affirmative proposition,
namely, ‘Some particular affirmative is false’. So they are both false, yet they
are contradictories, in that one denies what the other affirms.
Although ‘negation’ and ‘denial’ are often run together by the translators,
perhaps even by Aristotle himself, let us take it that ¬α and α are intended
by Priest and other modern authors to correspond to Aristotle’s pairs of con-
tradictories or opposites.45 Priest [23, p. 77] writes:
“We have a grasp of negation . . . and we can use this to determine
when ‘notting’ negates . . . [T]here appears to be a relationship of a
certain kind between pairs such as ‘Socrates is mortal’ and ‘Socrates
is not mortal’; and ‘Some man is mortal’ and ‘No man is mortal’.
The traditional way of expressing the relationship is that the pairs
are contradictories, and so we may say that the relationship is that of
contradiction. Theories of negation are theories about this relation.”
But recall that Aristotle described ¬α (that is, the opposite, or contradictory,
of α) as denying what α affirmed, or asserted. However, Priest [23, p. 104]
rejects an identification he attributes to Frege:
“to deny α is simply to assert ¬α.”
Rather, he says, we can deny something in many different ways:
“I can shake my head, say ‘no’ or even stomp off in a rage. Per-
haps more importantly, consider someone who supposes that some
sentences are neither true nor false.” (loc.cit.)
But none of these is incompatible with asserting ¬α, indeed, most of them
entail it. That’s certainly true of the head shake and saying ‘no’. Stomping off
suggests either implicit assertion of ¬α or the (badly named) metalinguistic
rejection of α, as in ‘I’m not the UK expert, I’m the world expert’.46 That is
not to deny you’re the UK expert, it entails that you are. Lastly, if a sentence
is neither true nor false, it’s not true.47 So denying α actually entails asserting
¬α.
It is the converse that Priest rejects. He claims that we can assert ¬α
without denying α. He is forced to do this by his definition of falsehood:
“The definition of falsity assures us that ¬α is true iff α is false.”48
45However, some commentators, e.g., Whitaker [32, p. 81], claim that for Aristotle, negation
was not an external operation, but rather, internal to the assertion, and so the notation ¬α
is not appropriate in his case.
46See [23, p. 77] and Horn and Wansing [14, §1.10].
47Intuitionists reject (BV) in a more subtle way, by refusing to assert that every proposition
is either true or false, but not by claiming that any given sentence is neither true nor false.
Since they assert the double negation of (EM), it would be inconsistent either to deny (BV)
or to assert its contradictory.
48Priest [23, p. 81].
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That is the weak (RCP), that if one of a pair of contradictories is true, the
other is false, and vice versa. Indeed, given his endorsement of (BV),49 Priest
is in fact committed to (RCP) in full, albeit cancelling the implicature of (CV).
Thus Priest retains (RCP) and rejects Frege’s Aristotelian identification of the
assertion of ¬α with the denial of α.
By rejecting (RCP), Aristotle is able to square rejecting (BV) and (EM)
with identifying negation and denial—and he could even reject (NC) and (CV),
though he chooses not to. Aristotle claims that if β denies (of x) what γ affirms
(of x), then β and γ are contradictories, that is, β = ¬γ. Faced with the coun-
terexamples in chs. 7–9 of De Interpretatione, Aristotle rejects (RCP), even in
its weakened form. Negation is accordingly non-truth-functional. The truth-
value of α does not determine that of ¬α (any more than that of, say, α).
How ‘¬’ behaves will depend on which, if any, of Aristotle’s, or Swyneshed’s,
counterexamples one accepts.
In contrast, Priest’s negation is truth-functional and his conception of
contradiction is semantic. Denying is no longer identified with the assertion
of the negation. So Aristotle’s and Swyneshed’s claim that contradictories can
both be false is a very different iconoclasm from dialetheism.
5. Conclusion
To sum up: Swyneshed enunciated three notorious consequences of his pro-
posed solution to the insolubles, the most famous of which is his claim that it
is possible for both members of a contradictory pair to be false. This appears to
run contrary to a basic principle, the Rule of Contradictory Pairs, that in each
such pair, one member is true and the other false, a principle often attributed
to Aristotle. But two recent authors who have looked closely at Aristotle’s
arguments in the central chapters of his treatise De Interpretatione claim that
Aristotle rejects this principle, presenting a succession of counterexamples to
it, culminating in his discussion of the future sea-battle in ch. 9.
Swyneshed himself likens his approach to the insolubles to the problem
of future contingents, citing them as counterexamples not only to the Rule
of Contradictory Pairs, (RCP), but also to the Principle of Bivalence, (BV).
Indeed, the paradoxes of signification, exemplified by the self-referential propo-
sition ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’, are counterexamples also to
the Law of Excluded Middle, (EM). Whatever may be wrong with Swyneshed’s
solution it is not that it is contrary to Aristotle’s teaching, if Whitaker and
Jones are right.
Graham Priest’s dialetheism claims that some contradictions, that is,
pairs of contradictories, are true, equivalently, that some propositions are both
true and false. In fact, Priest endorses (RCP), equating the falsehood of α with
the truth of ¬α (its negation). As a consequence, negation and denial come
apart, and ¬α is no longer the (Aristotelian) contradictory of α. Aristotle
49Priest [25, p. 146] observes that in his logic of paradox (LP), “each sentence is either true
or false or both.”
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and Swyneshed might appear to be in agreement with dialetheism, allowing
contradictories to be true or false together. But in contrast, they reject (RCP),
and at least in the case of the latter, (BV), and so this is only a superficial
agreement.
Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and re-
production in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence,
and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in
this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s
Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regu-
lation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdic-
tional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
References
[1] Aristotle: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics. The Loeb Classical Li-
brary. Heinemann, London. Categories and On Interpretation ed. and tr. Harold
P. Cooke, Prior Analytics ed. and tr. Hugh Tredennick (1938)
[2] Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Γ, Δ, E. Clarendon Aristotle Series. Clarendon
Press, Oxford. Translated with Notes by C. Kirwan (1971)
[3] Aristotle: Metaphysica, Lib. I-XIV: Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moer-
beka. Aristoteles Latinus XXV 3, 1-2. Brill, Leiden. G. Vuillemin-Diem (ed.)
(1995)
[4] Armstrong, D.: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge UP, Cambridge (1997)
[5] Boethius, A.: In: Meiser, C. (ed.) Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri
Hermeneias: Editio Secunda. Teubner, Leipzig (1880)
[6] Boethius, A.: On Aristotle On Interpretation. Boethius’ Second Commentary,
tr. Andrew Smith, pp. 1–3. Duckworth, London (2010)
[7] Bradwardine, T.: Insolubilia. Peeters, Leuven. Edited with English translation
by Stephen Read (2010)
[8] Conti, A.: Complexe significabile and truth in Gregory of Rimini and Paul of
Venice. In: Maieru`, A., Valente, L. (eds.) Medieval Theories on Assertive and
Non-Assertive Language, pp. 473–94. Leo S. Olschki Editore, Florence (2004)
[9] Conti, A.: Paul of Venice. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (summer 2017 edition). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford Uni-
versity, Stanford (2017)
[10] De Rijk, L.: Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology, vol. I. Brill, Leiden (2002)
Swyneshed, Aristotle and the Rule of Contradictory Pairs
[11] Hanke, M.: Paul of Venice and realist developments of Roger Swyneshed’s treat-
ment of semantic paradoxes. History and Philosophy of Logic 38, 299–315 (2017)
[12] Heytesbury, W.: On “Insoluble” Sentences: Chapter One of his Rules for Solving
Sophisms. Translated with an Introduction and Study by Paul Vincent Spade.
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto (1979)
[13] Horn, L.R.: Contradiction. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, spring 2014 edn. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,
Stanford (2014)
[14] Horn, L.R., Wansing, H.: Negation. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy, spring 2017 edn. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, Stanford (2017)
[15] Jones, R.: Truth and contradiction in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 6–9. Phrone-
sis 55, 26–67 (2010)
[16] Kneale, W., Kneale, M.: The Development of Logic. Oxford UP, Oxford (1962)
[17] Maieru`, A.: Terminologia Logica Della Tarda Scolastica. Editioni dell’Ateneo,
Rome (1972)
[18] Moore, G.: Moore’s paradox. In: Baldwin, T. (ed.) G.E. Moore: Selected Writ-
ings, pp. 207–12. Routledge, London (1993)
[19] Nuchelmans, G.: Theories of the Proposition. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1973)
[20] Paulus Venetus: Logica Magna. Bonetus Locatellus for Octavianus Scotus,
Venice (1499)
[21] Paulus Venetus: Pauli Veneti Logica Magna Secunda Pars, Tractatus de Veritate
et Falsitate Propositionis, et Tractatus de Significato Propositionis. Oxford UP,
Oxford. Published for the British Academy. Edited by Francesco del Punta and
Marilyn McCord Adams (1978)
[22] Pozzi, L.: Il Mentitore e il Medioevo. Edizioni Zara, Parma (1987)
[23] Priest, G.: Doubt Truth to be a Liar. Clarendon Press, Oxford (2006a)
[24] Priest, G.: In Contradiction, 2nd edn. Clarendon Press, Oxford (2006b)
[25] Priest, G.: Paraconsistency and dialetheism. In: Gabbay, D., Woods, J. (eds.)
The Many-Valued and Non-Monotonic Turn in Logic. Handbook of the History
of Logic, vol. 8, pp. 129–204. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2007)
[26] Read, S.: The rule of contradictory pairs, insolubles and validity. Vivarium (2020)
(to appear)
[27] Read, S., Thakkar, M.: Robert Fland–or Elandus Dialecticus? Mediaeval Stud.
78, 167–80 (2016)
[28] Spade, P.: Robert Fland’s Insolubilia: an edition, with comments on the dating
of Fland’s works. Mediaeval Stud. 40, 56–80 (1978)
[29] Spade, P.: Roger Swyneshed’s ‘Insolubilia’: edition and comments. Archives
d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du moyen aˆge 46, 177–220 (1979). Reprinted in
Spade (1988)
[30] Spade, P.: Roger Swyneshed’s theory of ‘Insolubilia’: a study of some of his
preliminary semantic notions. In: Eschbach, A., Trabant, J. (eds.) History of
Semiotics, pp. 105–13. John Benjamins, Amsterdam (1983). Reprinted in Spade
(1988)
S. Read Log. Univers.
[31] Spade, P.: Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages. Variorum, London
(1988)
[32] Whitaker, C.: Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic. Ox-
ford Aristotle Studies. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1996)
Stephen Read
Arche´ Research Centre
University of St Andrews
17-19 College St.
St Andrews KY16 9AL
Scotland, UK
e-mail: slr@st-andrews.ac.uk
Received: January 15, 2019.
Accepted: January 21, 2020.
